We study the effects of mortgage forbearance on local economies and individuals. During the Great Depression, twenty-five states adopted foreclosure moratoria that temporarily prevented lenders from seizing farms. By interrupting foreclosures during systemic crises, forbearance policies can avert fire sales, stabilize bank balance sheets, and dampen credit contractions. At the same time, they can raise the cost of capital and entrench land in the hands of less productive operators. We empirically evaluate these trade-offs using county-level agricultural data and linked full-count census records. We show that the moratoria preserved at least 250,000 farms nationwide and that counties most exposed to mortgages—and thus foreclosure risk—experienced a persistent 15% increase in the number of farms. Farmers protected by the policy, and their children, were significantly more likely to remain in agriculture and less likely to transition into manufacturing even two decades later. The moratoria shifted agricultural production toward smaller, more labor-intensive farms operating on more marginal land with lower capital intensity. The resulting delay in consolidation depressed farm revenues and asset values. At the same time, the policies raised local borrowing costs by roughly 10% during a period of substantial interest-rate convergence. We also find suggestive evidence that highly exposed counties developed weaker manufacturing sectors in the long run, consistent with slower labor reallocation out of agriculture. Taken together, our results show that well-intentioned policies that temporarily suspend creditor remedies can have significant long-run costs.

Proponents of the "Abundance Agenda" claim that opposition to zoning reform stems from narrow local constituencies, especially homeowners protecting property values. Since local politics is uniquely susceptible to capture by incumbents who benefit from housing scarcity, the prescribed policy solution is state or federal preemption of local land-use authority. This Article challenges that claim using a nationally representative survey of 60,000 voters in the 2024 election. This unusually large and rich dataset allows us to measure individual-level determinants of support for zoning reform while holding constant demographics, ideology, and neighborhood characteristics. We find limited support for several canonical NIMBY theories of restrictive zoning. Homeowners are indeed less supportive than renters, but the gap is modest. White respondents are less supportive than Black respondents, and racial resentment is strongly predictive of opposition to zoning reform, suggesting that racial exclusion remains a relevant explanation. Income, however, exhibits little independent relationship with zoning attitudes. Contrary to popular belief, liberals and voters concerned about the environment are more, not less, likely to support reform. We also identify two factors the literature has largely ignored: women are substantially less supportive than men (by a margin larger than the homeownership gap), and trust in state government strongly predicts support for zoning liberalization. These patterns suggest that many voters evaluate zoning reform primarily through its expected effects on school capacity, traffic, and public safety rather than through ideological or financial self-interest. Our findings cast doubt on the view that state or federal preemption alone can resolve political resistance to zoning reform. Shifting authority to state or federal governments may bypass local veto points, but it cannot eliminate the democratic constraints that drive opposition. We conclude that while bypassing local exclusionary tendencies through top-down governance is important, durable reform requires bottom-up coalition-building that addresses voter concerns about service quality and institutional competence.

This Article describes the emergence of "too-liable-to-regulate" fossil fuel companies: firms whose environmental liabilities are so large that they effectively become judgment-proof, enabling them to evade remediation and decommissioning obligations. Although liability is typically thought to reduce production and deter corporate misconduct, large cleanup liabilities can insulate companies from regulatory enforcement, since regulators may hesitate to pursue enforcement that would push distressed firms into liquidation.

To understand how the judgment-proof problem is affecting fossil fuel asset remediation, we compile every domestic coal mine reclamation (cleanup) and onshore gas plug and abandonment (P&A) law and calculate cleanup obligations for two companies: Diversified Energy, the largest oil and gas well owner in the United States, and Indemnity National, the country's largest insurer of coal mine reclamation obligations. Our estimates show that both firms' continued operation depends on predictable underenforcement of cleanup and decommissioning laws.

Our analysis of Diversified and Indemnity supports four theoretical points. First, judgment-proof fossil fuel companies are making it difficult for environmental regulators to manage the decline of extractive industries. Second, significant cleanup liability may, counterintuitively, encourage continued production and lead to worse environmental outcomes as firms with poor environmental records operate at a loss rather than paying for cleanup. Third, the judgment-proof problem creates regulatory challenges not just for individual firms, but across entire industries, since well-capitalized firms avoid cleanup by transferring burdensome assets to judgment proof companies. Fourth, the decline of coal mining has created an adverse selection problem in the market for reclamation-bond insurance. As solvent insurers have exited, one severely undercapitalized company—Indemnity National—now underwrites up to seventy percent of reclamation bonds in Appalachia. We conclude by proposing reforms that would improve environmental outcomes in markets that have already seen significant liability partitioning, and also describe best financial assurance practices to ensure that decommissioning funds are available in markets that have yet to encounter the emergence of too-liable-to-fail firms.